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NOTES
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS OR EMPLOYER
"SUBTERFUGE": THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT'S .PROHIBITION AGAINST
DISCRIMINATORY HEALTH PLANS
L Introduction
Most states have laws that prohibit employers from providing
their employees health benefits under discriminatory health-insurance
plans.' The Supreme Court, however, in FMC Corp. v. Holliday2
and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,3 has held that the
Employment Retirement Income Security Ac (ERISA) preempts
state laws that regulate health-benefit plans when the plan is self-
insured.5 Employers have been able to skirt state laws that prohibit
discriminatory health plans by implementing self-insured plans,
which, under FMC and Pilot Life, are regulated exclusively by
'See Eric C. Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against AIDS Victims:
Falling Through the Gaps of Federal Law-ERISA, the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1247, 1248-50 (1991). "Most
states prohibit AIDS discrimination in employee benefit plans through either employment
discrimination or insurance laws." Id. at 1248-50. Only nine states either exclude AIDS
or have not decided whether their anti-discrimination laws encompass AIDS. See id. at
1248-49 & n.6.
2 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
1 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
5 FMC, 498 U.S. at 65; Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57 (holding that ERISA preempts
state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper claims processing under
a self-insured employee benefit plan). A self-insured health-benefit plan differs from an
insured plan in that under a self-insured plan the employer pays benefits directly from
its own assets. See SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, ABA, EMPLOYEE
BENEFrrs LAW 1050-53 (1991). Under an insured plan, the employer pays a premium
to an insurer and the insurer provides claims administration services and pays benefits
to the employees. Id. Thus, under an insured plan, the insurer bears the risk of future
health-benefit payments, but under a self-insured plan the employer bears this risk.
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ERISA.6 Applying the Supreme Court's holdings in FMC and Pilot
Life, courts have further held that ERISA allows employers to
establish self-insured discriminatory health-benefit plans that have a
discriminatory impact on certain classes of employees.7 For example,
under ERISA, employers are permitted to cap lifetime health benefits
for AIDS-related illnesses at much lower levels than benefits for other
illnesses.8
Although ERISA prohibits an employer from denying benefits
in which its employees have vested interests or to which its
employees are otherwise entitled,9 the Supreme Court has held that
employers may amend or eliminate health benefits previously
afforded because employees do not have vested interests in health
benefits.10 As a result, an increasing number of employers have
implemented self-insured health plans to reduce costs and avoid state
anti-discrimination laws." In fact, limiting health benefits for AIDS-
related illnesses is becoming a particularly popular method for
employers to reduce the overall cost of their health-benefit plans.'
2
6 See 498 U.S. at 64; 481 U.S. at 57. These decisions have caused a shift by
employers toward self-insured health benefit plans. See Sohlgren, supra note 1, at 1251.
7 See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 400 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (holding
that ERISA does not prohibit employers from altering the substance of benefit plans);
McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 482 (1992) (allowing employer to limit health benefits for AIDS-related expenses);
Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that
employer's action causing loss of benefits does not violate ERISA); Young v. Standard
Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988) (permitting an
employer to alter employee benefit plans under ERISA).
'See, e.g., H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d at 408.
9See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). The statute declares that "[ilt shall be unlawful for
any person to . . .discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan." Id.
(emphasis added).
10 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985) (holding
that ERISA does not regulate the substance of benefits afforded under health-benefit
plans).
"1 See Sohlgren, supra note 1, at 1256; Christine Woolsey, More Small Firms Self-
Fund Benefits, Bus. INS., Jan. 28, 1991, at 3, 12-14; Jerry Geisel, Serf-Insurers Can
Limit AIDS Benefits, Bus. INS., Aug. 6, 1990, at 1.
12 See, e.g., Mary Pflum, EEOC Seeks to Compel Plan to Cover AIDS, Bus. INS.,
June 14, 1993, at 20 (discussing a suit brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission against the Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund for denying
HEALTH BENEFITS
Although employers have seemingly found a safety net to protect
themselves from employee suits alleging discriminatory health-benefit
plans, the Americans with Disabilities Act 3 (ADA) may now prohibit
employers from continuing these discriminatory practices.
14
This Note will demonstrate that an employer's obligation
under the ADA to eliminate discriminatory practices affecting
qualified employees with disabilities mandates that employers
structure their health-benefit plans in a nondiscriminatory manner.
First, this Note will examine the statutory language and legislative
history of the ADA as it relates to discriminatory health-benefit plans.
Second, this Note will show that relevant case law and administrative
regulations concerning the ADA and other federal anti-discrimination
laws require employers to afford all employees equal access to
comparable health benefits. Third, burdens of proof will be
discussed, by way of three hypothetical health-benefit plans that
afford less benefits for AIDS-related illnesses than for other illnesses.
Finally, this Note will conclude that the ADA should prohibit
employers from establishing or continuing discriminatory health-
benefit plans.
II. Statutory Language and Legislative History of the ADA
When Congress enacted the ADA, t  it sought to eliminate
health coverage to an employee infected with the AIDS virus). The "International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 110 caps treatment for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome at $50,000. All other diseases are covered up to $500,000."
Union Sued Over AIDS Cap, Bus. INS.. Mar. 29, 1993, at 2. See ADA Suit Challenges
AIDS Cap, Bus. INS., Sept. 20, 1993, at 62 (Victory Van Corp. capped AIDS benefits
at $25,000 per year and $50,000 over a lifetime.); Christine Woolsey, Union Plan to
Retain AIDS-Treatment Cap, BUS. INS., Oct. 4, 1993, at 60. The Laborer's District
Council Building and Construction Health and Welfare Fund, in June of 1992, capped
lifetime benefits related to human immunodeficiency virus at $10,000, while maintaining
lifetime benefits for other illnesses at $100,000. Woolsey, supra, at 60.
i3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1990).
1" See Monica E. McFadden, Note, Insurance Benefits Under the ADA:
Discrimination or Business as Usual?, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 480, 502-03 (1993).
S This Note concerns the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (Supp. II 1990), and the application of these provisions to the structure of
employer-provided health-benefit plans.
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discrimination against individuals with disabilities 6 in both the public
sector and private employment. 7 Subchapter I of the ADA prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees with disabilities in
all aspects of the employment relationship.' 8 The employer's duty to
eliminate discrimination in employment includes the duty to provide
nondiscriminatory fringe benefits, such as health benefits.'"
Subchapter IV of the ADA specifically addresses health-benefit plans,
and requires employers to structure their health-benefit plans based
on bona fide risk classifications."0 Thus, the plain language of the
ADA indicates that employers should not be able to discriminate
against employees suffering from specific diseases or illnesses by
reducing health benefits for those employees while maintaining more
generous health benefits for other employees.2"
A. ADA Subchapter I-Employment
The plain language of Subchapter I of the ADA bars
employers, in all aspects of employment, from discriminating against
employees with disabilities based on the disability of the employees. 22
6 Congress defined a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." Id. § 12102(2)(A).
17 Id. § 12101(b). Congress specified that the purpose of the ADA is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
[and]
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities ....
Id.
I Id. §12112(a).
19 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(0 (1992).
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
2! This Note focuses on discriminatory health-benefit plans rather than on whether
employees can perform the essential functions of a job. Accordingly, this Note assumes
that employees are otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of a job.
I The Act mandates that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
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Among other things, the ADA requires employers to eliminate
discrimination against disabled employees in fringe-benefit aspects of
employment,23 including those fringe benefits which are provided
through contracts with third parties.24 For example, the ADA
precludes employers from providing health insurance purchased from
a third-party insurer that would afford less coverage for a particular
class of disabled employees than it would for nondisabled
employees.25 Thus, whether an employer provides its employees
health-benefit coverage under a self-insured plan or by way of a
third-party insurer, the plain language of Subchapter I of the ADA
compels employers to design-or to restructure-their health-benefit
plans in a nondiscriminatory manner.26
Commentators have suggested that language in Subchapter IV
of the ADA, entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions,"27 eliminates
protection against discriminatory self-funded health-benefit plans that
employees would otherwise be afforded under Subchapter 1.21 These
commentators contend that, because the language of § 12201(c)(3)
2 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1992). The blanket prohibition against discrimination
includes fringe benefits, such as health benefits, because fringe benefits are considered
"privileges of employment." Id.
24 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1990). The Act states that:
[The term 'discriminate' includes ... participating in a contractual
or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting
a ...qualified [individual] with a disability to the discrimination
prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a
relationship with ... an organization providing fringe benefits to an




17 Id. § 12201(c). This Section provides that:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict . . . (3) a person or
organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that
is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Id.
See, e.g., Sohlgren, supra note 1, at 1290-91. Sohlgren states that "[t]he ADA
does not, therefore, appear to protect an employee from AIDS coverage restrictions
under a self-funded group health plan by adding protections not available under ERISA."
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demonstrates that the ADA should not disrupt ERISA preemption of
state insurance laws, employers are free to establish or continue
discriminatory self-funded health-benefit plans in the same manner
that they could before Congress enacted the ADA.29 Although §
12201(c)(3) states that the ADA does not affect ERISA's preemption
of state insurance laws, it should not be construed to mean that
ERISA is a safe harbor for discriminatory practices that violate
federal anti-discrimination statutes.30 Because ERISA, unlike the
ADA, does not regulate the substantive provisions of health-benefit
plans,31 no preemption problem exists between ERISA and the
ADA.32 In fact, the ADA and ERISA should be read in conjunction
and as compatible with one another. 33 Therefore, self-funded health-
benefit plans should not be exempt from the anti-discrimination
mandates of the ADA under § 12201(c).34
B. ADA Subchapter IV-Miscellaneous Provisions
In Subchapter IV, Congress specifically addressed health-
benefit plans, and, although it provided employers with some freedom
in structuring these plans, Congress retained the ADA's broad
2 See, e.g., David A. Copus & Glen D. Nager, Benefit Plan Limitations After the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 EMPL. REL. L.J. 77, 85 (1993).
" See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that Section 510 of ERISA does not prohibit employers from structuring health-benefit
plans that provide less coverage for specific diseases). The H & H Music court did not
address, however, whether employers are free to structure health-benefit plans that
discriminate against individuals in violation of other federal anti-discrimination laws.
See id. For example, Section 510 of ERISA would afford no protection to an employer
who structured a health-benefit plan that afforded a $1,000,000 lifetime cap for males
and a $20,000 lifetime cap for females, because such a plan would blatantly violate Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S.
1073, 1081 (1983) (holding that disparate payout of retirement benefits based on gender
violates Title VII); City of L.A. v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that
requiring women to contribute more than men to a pension plan violates Title VII); see
also McFadden, supra note 14, at 500-01.
3' See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
32 See McFadden, supra note 14, at 488-89.
3 See id.
34 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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proscription against discrimination." Under § 12201(c)(2),
employers are allowed flexibility to structure their health-benefit plans
based on "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering..
. risks" that comply with state laws.36 In addition, § 12201(c)(3)
preserves the ability of employers to provide health benefits under
self-insured plans, which do not implicate state insurance laws."
Employers, however, may not use these exceptions as a guise, or
"subterfuge," to evade the purposes and goals of the ADA.38 So, the
ADA allows employers to afford health benefits under insured plans
governed by state law, and under self-insured plans that are not
governed by state law.39 However, the fact that the ADA allows
employers to afford coverage under self-insured plans, which are not
regulated substantively by state law, does not compel the conclusion
that the ADA allows employers to discriminate under self-insured
plans.
The different references to state laws in §§ 12201(c)(2) and
12201(c)(3) show that, regardless of whether the health plan is
insured or self-insured, the employer may only afford reduced
benefits for a particular illness if such reduction in benefits is based
on "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
based on or not inconsistent with State law. "4 Whereas §
" See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2)-(3) (Supp. 11 1990).
3 The Act states that:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict . . . (2) a person or
organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that
are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering
such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.
Id. § 12201(c)(2).
3' The Act provides that:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict . . . (3) a person or
organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that
is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Id. § 12201(c)(3) (emphasis added).
31 Id. § 12201(c).
'9 See id.
1 42 U.S'.C. § 12201(c)(2)-(3) (Supp. [1 1990).
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12201(c)(3)-the section allowing for self-funded health-benefit
programs-refers to state insurance laws,41 § 12201(c)(2) requires
that employers structure their health-benefit plans in a manner
consistent with all state laws.42 Accordingly, employers are not free
to disregard state anti-discrimination laws when they structure self-
funded health-benefit plans.43 Moreover, because the statutory
language indicates that § 12201(c)(2) applies to both self-insured and
insurer-provided health-benefit plans, employers who self-insure
should be required to show that any disability-based distinction in
their health-benefit plans are based on one of the enumerated cost
justifications.'
Two commentators have suggested, however, that §
12201(c)(2) is limited to insured health-benefit plans that are
regulated by state insurance laws, and should not be read to
encompass self-insured plans that are not regulated by state insurance
laws.45 However, these commentators fail to focus on.Congress's use
of the term "insurance" in § 12201(c)(3), and the absence of that
term in § 12201(c)(2). Moreover, it seems inconsistent for Congress
to require cost justifications for insured benefit plans while at the
same time allowing self insurers freedom to discriminate against any
disability they so desire. Therefore, § 12201(c) should not only be
read to prohibit self-insurers from using benefit plans as a
"subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the ADA, but also to require
self-insurers to justify disability-based distinctions with accepted risk
classifications.
" Id. § 12201(c)(3) (allowing plans "not subject to State laws that regulate
insurance") (emphasis added).
42 See id. § 12201(c)(2) (requiring all health-benefit plans to be based on
"underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law").
43 See LABOR RELATIONS SECTION. D.C. BAR, DIST. OF COLUMBIA BAR TASK
FORCE REP. ON THE EFFECT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT ON
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS 54 n. 164 (1993) [hereinafter D.C. TASK FORCE
REP.].
4 See id. at 53.
45 Stephen M. Koslow & Mark R. White, Employer SponsoredHealth Benefits Under
the ADA, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 560, 562-63 (1992).
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C. Legislative History of the ADA
The ADA reflects Congress's paramount concern over the
preventing of discrimination against-and providing equal access to
employment for-individuals with disabilities."' In addition, Congress
expressed in the Act's legislative history that the goal of equal access
to employment means that individuals should not be denied the
opportunity to secure or maintain employment solely due to a
discriminatory health-benefit plan, which does not have a valid cost
justification for its disability-based distinction.47
Section 12201(c) was not included in the original draft of the
legislation, but was later added to clarify that:
(1) insurers may continue to sell to and underwrite
individuals applying for life, health, or other
insurance on an individually underwritten basis;
(2) employers . . . [may] establish and observe the
terms of employee benefit plans, so long as these
plans are based on underwriting or classification of
4See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990). The legislative history indicates that
Congress was concerned about discrimination in critical areas such as employment. H.
R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303. Moreover, Congress acknowledged that current federal and state laws did not
adequately address this problem. Id. Finally, Congress noted that discrimination against
people with disabilities includes the denial of health benefits. Id. Sohlgren states that
"[tihe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) was passed primarily as a national
mandate aimed at eliminating discrimination against the some forty-three million
Americans who have one or more physical or mental disabilities." Sohlgren, supra note
1, at 1288.
47 H.R. REP. No. 485(11) at 136-38. Although Section 12201(c) of the ADA reflects
Congress's intention to preserve the validity of state insurance laws, Congress was aware
that most states already had laws prohibiting discrimination in group health-insurance
plans. Specifically, the Congressional report states that:
This legislation should [not] affect the way the insurance industry
does business in accordance with State laws . . . . Virtually all
States prohibit unfair discrimination among persons of the same class
and equal expectation of life . . Under the ADA, a person with
a disability cannot be denied insurance or be subject to different
terms or conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the
disability does not pose increased risks.
Id. at 136.
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risks; and
(3) self-insured plans, which are currently governed
by the preemption provisions of. . . ERISA, are still
governed by that preemption provision and are not
41subject to state insurance laws.
The legislative history also reveals that, while Congress
wanted to preclude employers from discriminating against employees
with respect to health benefits, employers could impose health-benefit
limitations if such limitations were based on "sound actuarial
principles" or if they were related to actual or reasonably foreseen
claims experience.49 In fact, the legislative history reveals that
health-benefit plans do not violate the ADA merely because they do
not address the particular needs of each individual with a disability
requiring special treatment.50 Nonetheless, Congress did not intend
to permit employers to limit health benefits solely on the basis of a
disability, absent sound actuarial principles,"1 and legislated that
employers could not use the statutory cost-justification exceptions as
a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the ADA.2 So, while
Congress did not want to disrupt employee-benefit plans and other
aspects of insurance based on sound actuarial principles, Congress
also did not want employers to have free reign to structure health-
benefit plans that would limit or eliminate employment opportunities
for "disabled" individuals.
H.R. REP. No. 485(1I) at 137 (emphasis added).
49 H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-35 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 494. Coverage limitations because of physical or mental
impairment are permissible when they are related to actual or reasonably anticipated
claims experience. Id. This seems to be a nebulous standard that leaves more questions
unanswered than answered, such as: Who retains the burden of proof, and what
threshold is required before reasonably anticipated costs rise to the level where
discriminatory benefits no longer violate the ADA?
10 H.R. REP. No. 485(11) at 137. The ADA Committee clarified that "employee
benefit plans should not be found to be in violation of this legislation under impact
analysis simply because they do not address the special needs of every person with a
disability." Id.
SId. at 136-37; H.R. REP. No. 485(111) at 460.
52 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
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Ill. Interpreting the ADA's Health Benefit Provisions
A. The Meaning of "Subterfuge"
It is clear that Congress did not want employers to circumvent
the goals of the ADA through misapplication of the cost-justification
exceptions listed under § 12201(c). 3 This is reflected in the language
of the statute, which states that employers cannot use the exceptions
in § 12201(c) as a "subterfuge" to avoid the purposes of the Act. s'
However, Congress left the term "subterfuge" undefined in the
statute. Therefore, prior case law and other interpretive sources must
be examined to shed some light on what Congress intended when it
used "subterfuge" in Section 12201(c) of the ADA. The Supreme
Court, in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts,5" interpreted
the term "subterfuge" under another federal anti-discrimination
statute.5 6 Accordingly, examining Betts closely should provide some
insight into the meaning that Congress intended for the term
"subterfuge" in the ADA.
Betts concerned an action brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)." In Betts, the plaintiff
alleged that her employer's retirement plan violated the ADEA
because her eligibility for disability benefits varied depending on her
age when she retired."8 The retirement plan actually provided a dual
benefit level, one for age-and-service employees and one for disabled
employees.59 The disability benefit, however, was only available to
those employees who retired before the age of sixty, and far exceeded
the age-and-service benefits.60 Betts was sixty-one years old and was
S3 5ee id.
S4 Id.
492 U.S. 158 (1989).
5 Id. at 167 (stating that "subterfuge" in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), requires specific intent on the part of the employer to
evade the statutory requirement). The Supreme Court decided Betts before the ADA was
enacted. See 492 U.S. at 158.
s7 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); see Betts, 492 U.S. at 167.
5' 492 U.S. at 161-63.
'9 id. at 162.
60 Id. at 162-63.
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forced to retire because of a disability.' Thus, under the employer's
policy, Betts was only entitled to the age-and-service retirement
benefits, even though her disability forced her into retirement.62 The
age-and-service benefit for Betts was half the comparable disability
benefit.6
In dicta, the Court first commented that "subterfuge is to be
given its ordinary meaning, and that as a result an employee benefit
plan adopted prior to enactment of the ADEA cannot be a
subterfuge. " The Court then examined the regulations issued under
the ADEA, which required that employers justify lower levels of
benefits based on age with age-related cost considerations. 65  The
Court, however, dismissed the regulations as contrary to the statutory
intent and the plain meaning of the word "subterfuge. "" Instead, the
Court set forth its own definition of "subterfuge," stating that it
requires specific "'intent . . .to evade a statutory requirement.' "67
Thus, under the ADEA, the Supreme Court had set the stage for an
extremely difficult burden on employees to show that an employer's
acts amounted to "subterfuge," '68 because: (1) intent is always a
difficult element to prove; and (2) all of the evidence that could be
used to prove intent will be in the employer's possession. Some
commentators are concerned that if courts apply the Betts analysis in
ADA cases involving discriminatory health-benefit plans, employees
will rarely be successful in challenging such health plans. 69 Applying
11 Id. at 163.
62 id.
63 Betts, 492 U.S. at 163.
I Id. at 168. This was dicta because in this case the employer amended the
retirement plan after the ADEA was enacted. Id. at 169.
61 id. at 170.
6Id. at 170-71.
67 Id. at 171 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203
(1977)). The Court noted that "an employer may provide lesser amounts of insurance
coverage under a group insurance plan to older workers than he does to younger workers
where the plan is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act." Id. at 172 n.4.
' See Sohlgren, supra note 1, at 1293. Sohlgren argues that "[b]ased on this
interpretation of subterfuge, a court would be likely to hold that an AIDS coverage
limitation in an employee benefit plan does not evade the purposes of the ADA unless
the provision violates the substantive provisions of the ADA." Id.
6Id. at 1294.
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the Betts interpretation of subterfuge in ADA cases, however, may
be less onerous than it appears at first blush. In addition, differences
exist between the ADEA and the ADA that should preclude such a
result.
Unlike the ADEA, the ADA specifically addresses employee-
benefit plans.70 In fact, the Supreme Court in Betts noted that the
ADEA did not address employee-benefit plans.7" As the Court noted,
"Congress left the employee-benefit battle for another day and
legislated only as to hiring and firing, wages and salaries, and other
nonfringe-benefit terms and conditions of employment." Thus,
according to the Supreme Court, Congress simply did not intend for
the ADEA to govern employee-benefit plans.73
In contrast to the ADEA, the ADA and its legislative history
makes it clear that Congress intended for the Act's proscriptions to
apply to discriminatory employee-benefit plans.74 Section 12201(c)
of the ADA merely clarifies the manner in which the statute's broad
proscription against discrimination should be applied in the context
of health-benefit plans.7" In fact, the Supreme Court in Betts
acknowledged that a health plan that discriminated against a
statutorily protected group in itself would be a "subterfuge" to evade
the statute's purposes.76 Thus, a proper accord of Betts indicates that
o See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
7 492 U.S. at 177.
I' d. (emphasis added).
73 See id. (finding that the ADEA does not apply to "bona fide seniority systems and
retirement, pension, or other employment benefit plans" (quoting S. REP. No. 723, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967))).
74 See H.R. REP. No. 485(nI) at 136-38. This intent is apparent in that the
Congressional Report states that " [ujnder the ADA, a person with a disability cannot be
denied insurance or be subject to different terms or conditions of insurance based on
disability alone, if the disability does not pose increased risks." Id.
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. I1 1990).
76 492 U.S. at 177. The Betts Court struggled with the conflict between the anti-
discrimination law for elderly workers, and the reality of pension plan management,
which necessarily includes disparate benefits depending on age. Id. Arguably, the ADA
has a similar conflict between disability-based discrimination and underwriting
classifications for health-benefit plans. However, there is an important distinction
between developing a health plan based upon underwriting risks and implementing a
health plan to exclude a particular type of employee from the workplace. Where a
health plan excludes coverage for specified illnesses, but affords full coverage for other
1994]
98 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XII
§ 12201(c) must be construed in light of the purposes of the ADA.
In addition, unlike the ADEA, the ADA generally requires employers
to provide reasonable accommodations to their employees, unless to
do so would impose an undue hardship on the employer." The
ADA's cost-justification provisions dictate that employers must
investigate and implement "reasonable accommodations" unless to do
so would impose an "undue hardship ' 78 on the employer. 79 Although
illnesses, a presumption should exist that the plan violates the ADA and the employer
may overcome this presumption only by showing that the plan is not a subterfuge to
exclude a particular class of employees from the workplace. See Sohlgren, supra note
1, at 1298.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. 11 1990). This Section states that:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter
that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise
deny a job or benefit to an individual, with a disability has been
shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation, as required under this subchapter.
Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990) (providing that "the term
'discriminate' includes ... not making reasonable accomodations . . . unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered entity"); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(a)
(Supp. II 1990) ("The term 'undue hardship' means an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense .... ").
Id. § 12111(10). An "undue hardship" is defined in the ADA as:
[Aln action requiring significant difficulty or expense when
considered in light of...
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of
persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number
of its employees; the number, type and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce
of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.
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"reasonable accommodation" in this context refers to the employment
facilities or job requirements,8" the term "subterfuge" in the ADA's
health-benefit provision should be read with the Act's affirmative
duties and cost-justification provisions in mind.8" Accordingly, the
bite of the Betts decision should have much less sting under the ADA
than it has had under the ADEA.8 2
Commentators have suggested that employers operating bona
fide benefit plans should have a safe harbor for disability-specific
limitations adopted before the ADA was enacted.83 This argument,
however, ignores the plain language of the ADA and its cost-
justification approach, and improperly relies upon dicta in Betts.
The purpose of the ADA-to prevent discrimination against
individuals with disabilities-has been implemented at the state level
prior to the enactment of the ADA." Only by hiding behind the
protection of ERISA were employers able to legally "evade the
purposes" of these state laws with respect to health-benefit plans.8"
Moreover, the language of the statute indicates that employers cannot
use the cost-justification exceptions to evade the purposes of the
Act.86 This statutory scheme contradicts the argument that any plan
in force prior to enactment of the statute cannot be a "subterfuge."
87
Such a conclusion would ignore the affirmative duty throughout the
ADA for employers to implement reasonable accommodations for
qualified individuals with disabilities, unless to do so would impose
' See McFadden, supra note 14, at 482.
go See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
s' See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. 11 1990).
8 Congress reacted swiftly to the Betns decision, and enacted the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990), codified in 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (Supp. 1 1990), which employs the cost-justification approach and
eliminates the "subterfuge" language.
83 see, e.g., Copus & Nager, supra note 29, at 80-81.
"4 Under most state laws, employment discrimination against individuals with
disabilities is prohibited. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1735 (West 1989); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-2502, 1-2512, 6-1705 (1981); see also Sohlgren, supra note 1, at 1248-49
& n.6 (providing a complete list of all the state statutes that prohibit discrimination
against individuals with disabilities).
85 See supra note 9-11 and accompanying text.
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
'8 See McFadden. supra note 14, at 494.
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an undue hardship on the employer."8 For example, it would be
absurd to think that the ADA does not require an employer to
refurbish its restroom facilities to accommodate handicapped
individuals merely because that employer installed the restroom
facilities before the ADA was enacted. The same reasoning should
hold true with respect to health-benefit plans.89
The plain language of the ADA, and the context in which the
term "subterfuge" is employed therein, also contradict the conclusion
that health-benefit plans implemented prior to enactment of the ADA
fall within a "safe harbor."9 In fact, the legislative history of the
ADA specifically states that "subterfuge" is to be determined
"regardless of the date an insurance or employer [provided] benefit
plan was adopted. ""' Unlike the ADEA, the term "subterfuge" in the
ADA applies specifically to the use of health-benefit plans that, by
way of disability-based distinctions, preclude certain classes of
employees from equal access to employment opportunities.' Thus,
under the ADA, if an employer affords a health-benefit plan, which
contains disability-based distinctions, the employer would first have
to show that these distinctions are based on the enumerated cost
justifications outlined in the statute.93 Then, the employer should be
required to show that the cost justifications are not, in fact, being
used as a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the Act.'
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
disabled employees in all aspects of employment, including fringe
benefits such as health-benefit plans.9" The subterfuge language of
the ADA simply prohibits employers from using an otherwise cost-
justified health-benefit plan as a ruse to avoid the anti-discrimination
mandate of the ADA. 96 In other words, under the ADA, a health-
benefit plan that discriminates on the basis of a disability can be
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
8 See McFadden, supra note 14, at 494.
9 See Copus & Nager, supra note 29, at 80.
91 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1989).
9' See 42 U.S.C § 12201(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
See id.
4 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
96 See id. § 12201(c).
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deemed a "subterfuge" if it attempts to avoid the purposes of the Act,
even though the plan is based on the cost-justifications delineated in
the statute. 97
. Although there is no precedent yet, employers providing
health-benefit plans that afford less coverage for a particular illness
than for other illnesses will have difficulty showing that the reduction
in benefits is based upon acceptable cost justifications where the costs
associated with other illnesses are comparable.9" Thus, an employer
that desires to -reduce the cost of its health-benefit plan and still
comply with the ADA should reduce benefits for all catastrophic
illnesses evenhandedly, and refrain from implementing disability-
specific limitations, especially when the anticipated medical expenses
associated with the particular disability are not significantly greater
than anticipated medical expenses associated with other unaffected
disabilities. Only when an employer can justify the elimination or
reduction of coverage for a particular disability with sound actuarial
analysis should the employer be permitted to implement a disability-
specific limitation. Further support for this conclusion can also be
found in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
interim guidelines.99
B. The EEOC Guidelines
In June of 1993, the EEOC promulgated interpretive
See McFadden, supra note 14, at 494.
See Jerry Geisel, ADA Rules to Affect Few Health Plans, Bus. INs., June 14,
1993, at 1 ("[iH]ealth care plans that single out a particular disability-like AIDS or
schizophrenia-or a 'discrete' group of disabilities-like cancer or kidney
diseases-would be considered 'disability-based' and thus discriminatory under the ADA,
the [EEOCI commission said."). Whereas AIDS patients can expect to incur between
$25,000 to $147,000 in medical costs over their lifetimes, see Robert A. Hiatt et al., The
Cost of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Northern California, 150 ARcHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 833, 833-38 (1990), the medical costs of a breast cancer patient range
from $36,000 for chemotherapy to $89,700 for bone-marrow transplants. See Bruce E.
Hiliner et al., Efficacy and Cost-Effectiveness of Autologous Bone Marrow
Transplantation in Metastic Breast Cancer, 267 JAMA 2055 (1992).
" Interim Enforcement Guidance on Application of ADA to Disability Based
Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 6902
(June 8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
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enforcement guidelines concerning the manner in which the ADA
governs health-benefit plans." Although the EEOC promulgated
these guidelines for its own staff, the guidelines reflect the position
which the EEOC should take in litigation.101 According to the
guidelines, in order to determine whether an employer's health plan
violates the ADA, the EEOC will first decide whether the benefit-
plan distinction is a "disability-based distinction."" If the EEOC
determines that such a distinction exists, it will require the employer
to prove that the "disability-based distinction" falls within one of the
exceptions outlined in § 12201(c).1°3 Thus, if an employer's health-
benefit plan includes a "disability-based distinction," the EEOC will
require the employer to demonstrate that the plan is a bona fide self-
insured plan, which is not inconsistent with state law, and that the
"disability-based distinction" is not a "subterfuge" to evade the
purposes of the Act."
In its guidelines, the EEOC provides a list of possible
justifications to show that an employer's "disability-based distinction"
1oo Id.
101 See D.C. TASK FORCE REP., supra note 43, at 79 n.235 (1993).
"o EEOC Guidelines, supra note 99, at 5314.
'03 Id. These exceptions are identified as "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering risks." Id.
104 Id. at 5315-16. The EEOC provides a useful example of applying these
guidelines:
R Company's new self-insured health insurance plan caps benefits
for the treatment of all physical conditions, except AIDS, at
$100,000 per year. The treatment of AIDS is capped at $5,000 per
year. CP, an employee with AIDS enrolled in the health insurance
plan, files a charge alleging that the lower AIDS cap violates the
ADA. The lower AIDS cap is a disability-based distinction.
Accordingly, if R is unable to demonstrate that its health insurance
plan is bona fide and that the AIDS cap is not a subterfuge, a
violation of the ADA will be found.
Id. at 5315. Furthermore, the EEOC has stated that the burden of proof on these two
issues rests with the employer because the employer has easier access to the relevant
information. Id. at 5316. But see D.C. TASK FORCE REP., supra note 43, at 67-68
(arguing that, because St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) held that
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving discriminatory intent, even when the employer's
earlier articulated explanation for its action has been shown to be pretext, the burden of
proof should rest with the plaintiff employee in ADA cases).
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is not a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the Act.1"5 These
justifications include: (1) that the distinctions are based on legitimate
actuarial data or on actual or reasonably anticipated experience; (2)
that unlimited coverage for a discrete group of employees would
cause the plan to go insolvent; (3) that the distinctions would cause
significant adverse affects on plan costs or on the availability of
coverage for other employees; and (4) that the disability-specific
treatment is unnecessary for the disability. " Therefore, according
to the EEOC, the only way in which an employer can show that its
discriminatory plan is not a "subterfuge" is to set forth evidence that
the plan meets one of the above-mentioned cost-justifications. 7
Applying these guidelines, the EEOC has found instances
where disability-based distinctions in employers' health-benefit plans
were not based on sound actuarial principles or on actual or
reasonably anticipated claims experience and, therefore, that they
violated the ADA.' 08 For example, the EEOC found that the AIDS-
related benefit cap implemented by the Laborers District Council
Building and Construction Health and Welfare Fund (Fund) was an
action based on "fear," rather than on sound actuarial principles."°
Although it argued that the reduction of coverage for AIDS-related
benefits was due to financial concerns, 10 the Fund offered no hard
loS EEOC Guidelines, supra note 99, at 5317.
"o Id. at 5317-18.
107 See id. The EEOC's position in this regard is entirely consistent with the cost-
justification approach that exists throughout the ADA. See supra notes 77-81 and
accompanying text.
' See, e.g., EEOC Finds Union Health Fund Violated ADA by Capping HIV-Related
Benefits at $10,000, EMPLOYMENT POL'Y & L. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 29, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Labor Library, Bnaeld File.
,o See id. (reporting that the Fund reduced coverage for HIV-related benefits to
$10,000 over a lifetime while maintaining a $100,000 cap for benefits not HIV-related).
110 See id. The Fund argued that it needed to cap HIV-related benefits because of
its precarious financial state caused by a decline in hours worked by union members and
rising health-care costs in recent years. Id. The Fund also cited the lifestyles of its
members, who it claimed were at greater risk for HIV infection because of greater-than-
average drug use and other factors. Id. The Fund's trustees feared that several
members might develop full-blown AIDS within a short time, causing the fund to incur
high medical costs leading to bankruptcy. Id.
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data to illustrate this."'t The EEOC's tough stance
in this case, as well as its tough stance in Mason Tenders v.
Donaghey,1"2 indicates that it will continue to oppose strongly
discriminatory health-benefit plans in the future.
C. Rehabilitation Act Cases
In Subchapter IV of the ADA, entitled "Miscellaneous
Provisions," Congress provided an important standard to be employed
when applying the mandates of the other subchapters. Congress
stated that the ADA should follow the same standards that are
employed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its corresponding
regulations."' In addition, the EEOC noted that the Rehabilitation
Act case law will generally apply under the ADA. 1 4 Thus,
examining the case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act should
provide meaningful insight into Congress's intent when it enacted the
ADA.
Support for the EEOC's cost-justification approach can be
found in the few cases that have interpreted Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which deals with health-benefit plans. 1 5 In
.. See id. The EEOC also found that a similar health-benefit plan implemented by
the Mason Tenders District Council Trust Fund also violated the ADA. Id. The Trust
Fund moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. Without opinion, the district court denied the motion. Mason
Tenders v. Donaghey, No. 93-Civ. 1154 (JES), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993).
"2 No. 93-Civ. 1154 (JES), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,
1993); see EEOC Finds Union Health Fund Violated ADA by Capping HIV-Related
Benefits at $10,000, EMPLOYMENT POL'Y & L. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 29, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Labor Library, Bnaeld File.
..3 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. 11 1990). The ADA provides that: "Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title." Id.
114 29 C.F.R. § 1030 (1994) (EEOC's Interpretive Guildeline on Title I of the ADA).
"' 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). The Act mandates that "[no otherwise qualified
handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. Case law
1994] HEALTH BENEFITS 105
Alexander v. Choate,"6 the Supreme Court held that § 504 proscribes
more than just intentional discrimination, and could apply to certain
types of disparate-impact discrimination. " 7 In discussing intentional
discrimination against handicapped individuals, the Court noted that
discrimination against handicapped people was not usually the product
of invidious intent, but rather was the product of "thoughtlessness and
indifference."'1 Although the Supreme Court did not define the
parameters of discrimination that could be actionable under the
Rehabilitation Act, it did recognize that a court's approach to
discrimination issues dealing with people suffering from disabilities
differs markedly from invidious discrimination issues arising in such
contexts as race or gender." 9 Thus, similar to the discrimination
standard advocated by the Supreme Court in Choate,120 the ADA
should be interpreted by the courts in light of the same noninvidious
nature of discriminatory acts affecting individuals with disabilities.',
Although the Supreme Court in Choate did not find that a reduction
in the number of hospital days covered by Medicaid violated the
Rehabilitation Act, the Court noted that benefit reductions applied
differently to disabled individuals would violate the Rehabilitation
interpreting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is illuminating because, not only is the
Rehabilitation Act the precursor to the ADA, the ADA itself states that "nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. H 1990).
116 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
"I Id. at 299. The Court stated that "[wihile we reject the boundless notion that all
disparate-impact showings constitute prima facie cases under § 504 [of the Rehabilitation
Act], we assume without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an
unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped." Id.
"11 Id. at 295-96. During this discussion, the Court focused on the legislative history
of the Rehabilitation Act, which consistently mentioned indifference and neglect instead
of affirmative acts of invidious discrimination. See id.
119 See id. at 293-94. The Court explained that "much of the conduct that Congress
sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to
reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by discriminatory intent."
Id. at 296-97. The Court then gave an example that illustrated why the Act should not
be construed to require discriminatory intent, stating, "elimination of architectural
barriers was one of the central aims of the Act . . . yet such barriers were clearly not
erected with the aim or intent of excluding the handicapped." Id. at 297.
120 See id. at 299.
... See McFadden, supra note 14, at 498-500.
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Act. 122
Lower federal court decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act have employed the same policy concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court in Choate. For example, in Bernard B. v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield,12 a federal district court held that a plan that
disparately discriminated against individuals needing psychiatric care
did not violate the Rehabilitation Act if there existed "substantial
justification" for the coverage distinction. 24 In Bernard B., the
plaintiffs alleged that the exclusion of psychiatric benefits from the
health-care provider's "minimum" benefits plan violated the
Rehabilitation Act. '25 The court, after holding that the defendant had
the burden of proof on this issue, found that the plan was
substantially justified by cost considerations. 126 It is noteworthy that
the Bernard B. court did not require the plaintiffs to prove that the
health-care provider intentionally discriminated against them, but
rather looked at the health plan itself, and required the health-care
provider to show that the disability-based distinction was based on
sound cost considerations. 1
27
This cost-justification approach 128 is at odds with the position
taken by some commentators who advocate that plaintiffs should be
required to prove that their employers specifically intended to avoid
the purposes of the ADA when they structured their discriminatory
health-benefit plans. However, because disabled individuals have not
been subject to the same instances of invidious discrimination as, for
example, minorities, the statutes that prohibit discrimination against
disabled individuals cannot be construed to prohibit solely intentional
discrimination. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, must, out of
necessity, proscribe disparate or unintentional discrimination. Thus,
the EEOC's cost-justification approach, with the burden of proof
"22 See 469 U.S. at 304.
'2 528 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).




1 2 The court noted that "[miedical coverage is structured around the identification
of categories of benefits and a calculation of risk and consequent costs for that
coverage." Bernard B., 528 F. Supp. at 132-33.
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resting with the defendant (i.e., employers, unions, and health-care
providers), should be used by the courts when deciding whether a
discriminatory health-benefit plan violates the ADA.
IV. Hypothetical Health-Benefit Plans
Because the ADA has only been effective since July of 1992,
there is little case law interpreting the provisions of the statute. The
EEOC, however, has recently seen a rise in the number of claims
alleging ADA violations. At the writing of this Note, the only case
involving discriminatory health coverage under the ADA-Mason
Tenders v. Donaghey-is set to be heard by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 129
This Part will outline three hypothetical health-benefit plans
that disparately impact on individuals suffering from AIDS.
Furthermore, this Part will predict the likely reaction by the EEOC
to these benefit plans, as well as the judicial response that most
closely tracks the statutory language and legislative history of the
ADA.
A. Plan I: Intentional Discrimination
Employer Y does not want to employ any individuals that are
HIV positive. In order to accomplish this goal, Y decides to reduce
the lifetime health-benefit cap for AIDS-related benefits to $10,000,
while maintaining a $200,000 benefit cap for all other catastrophic
illnesses. Employee X, hearing of the health-plan amendments, files
a claim with the EEOC because he is HIV positive.
The EEOC, upon receiving X's claim, would likely
determine that Y's health-benefit plan violates the ADA. The EEOC
would base this finding on § 12112(a), which states, in pertinent part,
that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and other privileges of
'" No. 93-Civ. 1154 (JES), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,
1993) (denying defendant-union's motion for summary judgment).
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employment." 3  Section 12201(c) of the ADA should not be
implicated, because Y did not base the limitation in the company's
health plan on any of the cost justifications delineated in the ADA.1
3 1
Furthermore, it is likely that the judiciary would uphold the EEOC's
determination because discrimination in this instance is blatant, and
violates the basic mandate of the ADA-the elimination of disability-
based discrimination.
B. Plan II: Disparate Discrimination
Without Cost Justification
Employer Y has experienced a few AIDS-related health-
benefit claims over the last few years. In response, Y reduces
coverage for AIDS-related benefits from the $200,000 lifetime cap,
which still applies to other catastrophic illnesses, to $10,000.
However, Y has not reviewed the plan to determine the effect that
reducing the lifetime cap for AIDS-related benefits will have on the
company's health plan. Y also has not examined any other
alternatives that would help reduce health costs. In response,
employee X, who is infected with the AIDS virus, files a complaint
with the EEOC.
This hypothetical is similar to the Mason Tenders case. The
EEOC would likely find that Y violated the ADA by discriminating
against an individual with a disability in regard to a privilege of
employment. 132 Y would likely counter that the disability-distinction
falls within the exceptions outlined in Section 12201(c) of the ADA.
The EEOC, based on its position in the Mason Tenders case, would
probably require Y to demonstrate that the disability-based distinction
was based on "sound actuarial principles."' Because Y could not
' 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. H 1990); see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. I 1990).
3 See id. § 12112(a).
133 See Brief for EEOC at 7. Mason Tenders v. Donaghey, No. 93-Civ. 1154 (JES),
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993).' The EEOC argued that
"(t]he Fund has not met its burden to demonstrate that the AIDS exclusion, a disability-
based distinction in employment benefits, is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the ADA." Id.
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offer any evidence to show that the disability-based distinction in his
health-benefit plan is based on an insurance risk classification or on
sound actuarial principles, the EEOC's determination should be
upheld by the judiciary. However, this issue has not yet been
decided by the courts.
Y would argue that so long as his acts did not amount to a
"subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the ADA, the legitimacy of the
health-benefit plan should be upheld. Furthermore, Y would argue
that his actions could not amount to a subterfuge, unless he
specifically intended to violate the purposes of the Act, and that, so
long as his motivation was to reduce costs, his action could not be a
subterfuge."34 Y would finally argue that the burden of proof to show
intentional discrimination rests with the plaintiffs.
Y's arguments should fail, however, because the ADA states
that only those health-benefit plans that are based on accepted risk
classifications will not be disturbed by the application of the statute's
proscriptions.1" Y, on the other hand, amended his health-benefit
plan based on his own unconfirmed belief that the reduction in AIDS-
related benefits would reduce costs without examining the
alternatives, and without formally analyzing the impact of the change.
Accordingly, the judiciary should not even reach the subterfuge
question, because here Y's health-benefit plan fails to meet any cost
justifications outlined in the statute. With respect to the burden-of-
proof issue, once X has made a prima facie showing of disparate
impact or discriminatory effect, Y should bear the burden to show
that its health-benefit paln was based on sound actuarial principles. 36
C. Plan III: Subterfuge
Employer Y desires to terminate the employment of several
134 See Copus & Nager, supra note 29, at 85.
'"See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
'3 See Peter D. Blanck et al., AIDS Related Benefits Equation: Cost Times Need
Divided by Applicable Law, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 1, 4. According to these
authors, Judge Sprizzo, during oral argument of defendant's motion for summary
judgment in Mason Tenders, stated that the plaintiff only need show disparate impact,
and that the defendant bears the burden to show that any disability based distinction was
based on "sound acturial assumptions." Id. at 4.
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employees who he believes are HIV positive. To accomplish this
goal, Y decides to make amendments to his health-benefit plan.
However, Y is also aware that the ADA prohibits discriminating
against disabled individuals. Accordingly, Y hires an actuarial firm
to review his health-benefit plan, and to advise methods to reduce
costs. Y advises the actuarial firm of his desire to terminate
employees who are HIV positive. After a preliminary review, Y's
actuarial firm reports that, among other things, Y can save money by
reducing health coverage for AIDS-related illnesses. The only
change that Y makes to the benefit plan, however, is reducing
coverage for AIDS-related illnesses. When X, an employee with
AIDS, learns of the reduced AIDS-related benefits, he files a
complaint with the EEOC.
Two distinctions exist between this hypothetical and the
hypothetical outlined in Plan II. In this Plan, Y is motivated to evade
the purposes of the ADA. It is apparent from this hypothetical that
X would have a difficult time generating proof that Y's actions
constituted a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act, because Y
has the availability of an actuarial study to show that reducing AIDS-
related benefits was cost justified. Accordingly, the burden of proof
should rest with the employer to show that reducing benefits was not
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.
The EEOC would probably find that Y's actions violated the
ADA, because it is not enough to show that an amendment of health
benefits has some cost justification. 3 7 The employer should also be
required to show that its actions were not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the Act.'38 Here, Y did not investigate the other
117 See Brief for EEOC at 14, Mason Tenders v. Donaghey, No. 93-Civ. 1154 (JES),
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993). The EEOC noted that:
Although the Fund has offered a document, prepared by an actuarial
firm, purporting to justify the plan's AIDS exclusion on actuarial
grounds... all the document shows is that the Fund has subjected
AIDS-related expenses to a degree of scrutiny that has not been
applied to expenses associated with any other physical or mental
condition. This practice of selective examination is in itself
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alternatives that the actuary suggested. Such alternatives may have
included measures that did not have a discriminatory impact on a
protected class of employees. Accordingly, the EEOC would find
that Y did not meet his burden of proof to show that his actions were
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA.'39 It remains to
be seen whether the judiciary will follow the EEOC's reasoning.
However, the district court in Mason Tenders viewed this as a
question of fact for a jury to determine.
40
These hypotheticals are just a few examples of the endless
sort of factual and legal disputes that could arise under the ADA.
These examples, however, do illustrate the difficult position disabled
employees are in to prove specific intent to discriminate when their
employers have structured discriminatory health-benefit plans. The
courts should be cognizant of the history of "thoughtlessness and
indifference" 14 ' to individuals with disabilities and should allocate the
burdens of proof to the party with the more facile access to relevant
information.
V. Conclusion
Although the extent that an employer is precluded from
establishing discriminatory health-benefit plans has not yet been
played out in the courts, the ADA should adequately protect disabled
employees. The statutory language of the ADA shows that employers
are prohibited from discriminating against disabled employees in all
aspects of employment, including "privileges of employment. "
42
This broad requirement includes the obligation to afford
nondiscriminatory health-benefits, whether insured or self-insured.
43
Moreover, the cost-justification exceptions of the ADA' 44 should be
construed as a requirement on employers to justify any disability-
based limitation in coverage, and the burden of proof to show such
13 See id.
140 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032, at *1.
141 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
141 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(0 (1992).
'"42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
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cost justifications should rest with the defendant. Finally, even if a
rational cost justification exists for a disability-based coverage
limitation, the employer should also be required to prove that its cost
justification is not a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the ADA. 4
The legislative history of the ADA supports this scheme of
liability and burdens of proof.1 4  Congress's main goal when it
enacted the ADA was to eliminate discrimination against disabled
Americans. 147 Only by holding employers to strict standards and by
not allowing them to evade the mandates of the statute under the
guise of the statutorily permitted cost justifications will Congress's
goals be furthered.
One would anticipate that much of the case law that will
develop in this area will hinge upon who the term "subterfuge."
Based on the EEOC's interpretation, "subterfuge" should mean that
the employer cannot use cost justifications as a guise to evade the
purposes of the Act. 148  Under the ADA, the burden of proving
subterfuge-or lack thereof-should rightfully be on the employer,
because the employer has access to all of the underwriting and
classifying information that was used to develop the health-benefit
plan. 49 It is also important to note that, regardless of whether the
employer had evil intentions, the employer at least has to show that
any disability-based distinction is based on one of the enumerated cost
justifications. If the employer cannot do this, the "subterfuge" issue
should not come into play.
The ADA states that it encompasses at least the minimum
standards of the Rehabilitation Act.' 50 Accordingly, the courts should
look to cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act for guidance when
deciding ADA cases. Although the issue of discriminatory health
plans has not come up under the Rehabilitation Act, the reasoning of
the courts hearing Rehabilitation Act cases on related issues can be
145 See id.
146 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. 11 1990); supra note 46-47 and accompanying
text.
1' See Brief for EEOC at 14, Mason Tendersv. Donaghey, No. 93-Civ. 1154 (JES),
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993).
'49 See id.
ISo 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
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useful. These cases demonstrate that concerns for disability-based
discrimination have existed for quite some time.
The EEOC has taken a firm stance on this issue, and has
required employers to justify discriminatory health plans. Although
the EEOC's decisions can-and may be-overturned in the courts,
employers should be cognizant of the EEOC's approach to these
issues today.
Individuals with disabilities ought to be afforded the same
employment opportunities as those that do not have disabilities.
Employers simply cannot be allowed to discriminate selectively
against individuals suffering from disabilities by implementing
discriminatory health-benefit plans. The ADA is an appropriate tool
to protect these individuals from such discriminatory practices by
employers.
John E. Estes

